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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Woodside had knowledge of defective soil conditions on the property

sold to Appellees/Respondents.
2.

Whether conditions existing on a parcel of land near the property sold to

Appellees/Respondents were material to the conditions existing on Appellees/Respondents'
lot, whether Woodside knew of those conditions or had a duty to discover them, and whether
Woodside had a duty to disclose the conditions on the nearby parcel.

1

RESPONSE TO BUYERS' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
In an effort to cloud the issues before the Court, Buyers list thirty allegedly material
facts and do not respond to Woodside's material facts. The additional "facts," however, miss
the mark. The basis of Woodside's motion in the district court was that Buyers failed to
provide any evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, that Woodside knew about
the presence of collapsible soils on their lot. Most of Buyers' additional facts deal with
events that occurred after Buyers' house was constructed and are not relevant to Woodside's
knowledge about adverse soil conditions on Buyers' lot Buyers' additional material facts
do not raise an issue of fact concerning Woodside's knowledge, do not contradict the
conclusions of the Field Report, and are irrelevant to the issues raised by Woodside's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.1
ARGUMENT
I.

BUYERS CONCEDE THAT WOODSIDE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF
DEFECTIVE SOIL CONDITIONS ON THEIR PROPERTY.
In granting Woodside's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, this Court stated that one of

the issues under review was "[wjhether [Woodside] had knowledge of defective soil
conditions on the property sold to [Buyers]." (See Order dated July 18, 2005 (emphasis
added)). Buyers do not address this issue, but instead argue that the issue is whether

l

In addition, Buyers continue to misstate what is contained in the report that was
prepared for a parcel near Buyers' lot (the "Delta Report"). Specifically, Buyers assert that
the Delta Report reveals collapsible soils to a depth of eight feet in the test pit nearest
Buyer's lot. (Brief of Appellees at 5, n. 1.) That is false. The nearest test pit to Buyers' lot
was test pit 6, which is 120 feet away from a corner of Buyers' lot and reveals the presence
of collapsible soils to a depth of five feet. (R. at 429, 436.) Buyers repeat this inaccuracy
throughout their brief.
2

Woodside had knowledge of collapsible soil around the Buyers' property. (Brief of
Appellees at 8.) That is not the issue before the Court. Buyers' new argument and failure
to address the issue listed by the Court constitute an implicit admission by them that
Woodside did not have knowledge of defective soil conditions on their lot.2 Buyers know
that Woodside did not have such knowledge and have done nothing to show that the district
court erred in any way in concluding that
(1) prior to construction, Woodside was aware of the existence of collapsible soils on
Plaintiffs' lot to a depth of two and one-half feet; (2) between six and eight feet of soil
was removed during the excavation for Plaintiffs' house; (3) after inspecting the
excavation, a soils engineer indicated to Woodside that the underlying soils would
support the Plaintiffs' house; (4) Woodside followed the recommendations of the soils
engineer in laying the foundation of Plaintiffs' house; and (5) during construction and
after the completion of Plaintiffs' house, Woodside understood that all of the
collapsible soils had been removed from Plaintiffs' lot. Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated that Woodside had any knowledge of remaining collapsible soils on
Plaintiffs' lot. Therefore, Plaintiffs failed to raise any issue of material fact that
would preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of Woodside.3
(R. at 900.)

2

Buyers also present an argument that Woodside has somehow misconstrued the
appropriate standard of review in this case by citing Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4501(2)(b). Woodside's discussion of Rule 4-501(2)(b), which was in effect at the time the
district court entered summary judgment in favor of Woodside and is therefore applicable,
is included to show the Court that the facts submitted by Woodside in its opening brief were
(1) undisputed or improperly disputed by Buyers in the district court; (2) properly treated as
admitted by the district court; and (3) improperly disregarded by the Court of Appeals.
Because the district court correctly treated Woodside's facts in support of its motion for
summary judgment as admitted, those facts must be deemed admitted for purposes of this
appeal, and there is no requirement to construe those facts in any other light, as is urged by
Buyers. (See R. at 764-68 for a discussion of Buyers' failure to comply with Rule 4-501.)
3

The district court's conclusion is consistent with the holding in Fennell v. Green,
2003 UT App. 291, 77 P.3d 339, which is discussed in detail in Woodside's Opening Brief.
3

Buyers did not dispute the facts relied upon by the district court in determining that
summary judgment was proper, nor did they dispute them in the Court of Appeals or in its
brief to this Court. The only knowledge that is at issue in this lawsuit is what knowledge
Woodside had about collapsible soils on Buyers' lot, and it is undisputed that Woodside
understood that all defective soils were removed from Buyers' lot. Buyers failed to raise any
issue of fact precluding entry of summary judgment in favor of Woodside and have not
remedied that deficiency on appeal.
It is undisputed that Woodside obtained a soils report for the area that included
Buyers' lot ("SHB Report"). (R. at 471-514.) That report revealed the presence of
collapsible soils at shallow depths, which were removed during construction of Buyers'
house. (R. at 400,403-04.) Woodside completed the mass excavation for Buyers' house and
requested that the soils engineer who provided the earlier soils report inspect the specific site
where Buyers' house was to be built. The engineer provided a field report for Buyers' lot
that concluded that the underlying soils would support Buyers' house ("Field Report"). (R.
at 403-04.) The specific report for the Buyers' lot thus informed Woodside that there were
no collapsible soils left where the house was built. Because Woodside did not have any other
knowledge about the soil on Buyers' lot that contradicted the Field Report, there was no duty
to communicate anything about the soil to Buyers. Cf Fennel!, 2003 UT App. 291, U 12.
The only report that Woodside had that specifically discussed the conditions on Buyers' lot
concluded that the underlying soils would support Buyers' house.

4

II.

BUYERS ATTEMPT TO CONFUSE THE ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT BY
FOCUSING ON EVENTS THAT DO NOT ADDRESS THE CONDITIONS ON
BUYERS' PROPERTY.
A.

The Delta Report is not Material to the Conditions on Buyers' Lot.

Faced with their inability to raise an issue of fact about Woodside's knowledge of
adverse soil conditions on their lot, Buyers follow the same pattern they have throughout this
lawsuit. They ignore the issues this Court wants addressed and instead attempt to distract the
Court by focusing on the Delta Report, a report that discusses soils conditions on a nearby
parcel of land, not the property purchased by Buyers.4
The test pit nearest Buyers' lot discussed in the Delta Report is 120 feet away,
indicating collapsible soils to a depth of five feet. (R. at 429, 436.) The SHB Report
indicated that there were collapsible soils on Buyers' lot to a depth of 2/4 feet. The soils
engineer inspected the underlying soils on Buyers' lot and concluded they would support the
construction of Buyers' house. So even if Woodside is charged with knowledge of the
contents of the Delta Report, that knowledge was superseded by the knowledge gained from
the Field Report provided by a soils engineer. Woodside's action were cautious, not
fraudulent. Buyers do not mention the Field Report anywhere in their brief and would be
glad if the Court were to overlook the Field Report as well. The Field Report renders the

4

Woodside has stated that for purposes of this appeal, the Court can infer that
Woodside was aware of the contents of the Delta Report because the Delta Report does not
provide any information about Buyers' lot. The undisputed facts below, however, show that
Woodside did not possess the Delta Report until 1997. (R. at 534.) Woodside has
consistently taken this position throughout this appeal.
5

contents of the Delta Report obsolete with respect to the conditions on Buyers' lot and
therefore immaterial.
The Court of Appeals misapprehended the scope of the Delta Report and essentially
disregarded the Field Report in concluding that if Woodside possessed the Delta Report it
had a duty to disclose it. The Court of Appeals creates a burden unrecognized by any other
court. Under the Court of Appeals holding as it now stands, even if a builder obtains a
specific report for a subject parcel, it may be held liable for fraud if it fails to disclose a
report about a nearby parcel that does not discuss the conditions on the subject parcel. Such
a burden is unreasonable and cannot be allowed to stand as a basis for fraud liability against
a builder.
B.

The Seawright's Problems are not Material to Conditions on Buyers5 Lot-

Buyers' argue that Woodside committed fraud by not providing information about a
nearby lot owned at the time by the Seawrights. Unlike Buyers' lot, the Seawright residence
is located on the property covered by the Delta Report and in addition does not adjoin
Buyers' lot. (See R. at 752. Buyers' lot is 304. The Seawright lot is 203.)

Instead, it is

approximately four lots (more than a football field) away from Buyers and located at the
bottom of a swell while Buyers' lot is located at the top of a hill. Any information about the
Seawright residence that was allegedly learned by Woodside came after the completion of
the mass excavation for Buyers' house and revealed the existence of collapsible soils to a
depth of three feet. None of this information is material to Buyers' lot as more than three feet
of soil was removed from Buyers' lot.

6

III.

THE ISSUE OF THE MATERIALITY OF THE DELTA REPORT WAS NOT
ADDRESSED BY THE DISTRICT COURT AND WAS PROPERLY RAISED
WITH THIS COURT IN WOODSIDE'S PETITION.
Buyers argue that the district court held that the Delta Report was material to the

conditions on Buyers' lot. (Brief of Appellee at 13.) To support this contention, Buyers' cite
a line from the district court's ruling ("Ruling") out of context. While the district court did
state that "the continued presence of collapsible soils would be material information[,]" it
went on to state that "[g]iven the undisputed facts, this Court finds that [Buyers'] fraudulent
non-disclosure claim against Woodside fails because there were no facts presented to show
that Woodside knew of remaining collapsible soils on [Buyers'] lot. . . . " (R. at 899
(emphasis added).) Clearly, by referring to the "continued presence" of collapsible soils, the
district court was referring to the continued presence of collapsible soils on Buyers' lot. The
materiality of the Delta Report or any other information about nearby parcels was not
addressed by the district court because it was undisputed that Woodside did not have
knowledge of collapsible soils on Buyers' lot. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals addressed
the materiality of the Delta Report and that issue is properly before this Court in accordance
with its Order of July 18, 2005. As is discussed in Woodside's opening brief, the Delta
Report is not material because it does not discuss the conditions on Buyers' lot, and
regardless of what is contained in the Delta Report, it is superseded by the Field Report,
which stated that the soils on Buyers' lot were suitable for construction.

7

IV,

BUYERS FAIL TO DISTINGUISH FENNELL V. GREEN OR SMITH V.
FRANDSEN.
A.

Under Fennell Woodside Had No Duty to Disclose Information to Buyers.

Buyers mischaracterize the district court's Ruling in an attempt to bolster the holding
of the Court of Appeals. The Ruling does not discuss the Delta Report. (R. at 898-902.)
The Delta Report is only mentioned in the background section of the Ruling. Contrary to the
Court of Appeals' belief that the district court found that the Delta Report was material, the
district court made no such determination.5
Buyers contend that the district court did not rely on Fennell because it did not cite
Fennell in its Ruling. This argument belies the fact that Woodside briefed and argued
Fennell to the district court and that the Ruling precisely follows the analysis contained in
Fennell. The Fennell court concluded "Fennell's fraudulent nondisclosure claim against
Wall and Green fails because there were no facts presented to show that Wall or Green knew
of a possible landslide condition on [Fennell's] lot.. .." Fennell 2003 UT App 291, ^ 11.
Just as the Fennell court concluded that there was no fraud when the developer was not aware
of adverse conditions on the subject lot, the district court held that there was no fraud where

5

The Court of Appeals states that "[t]he sole basis for the trial court's grant of
summary judgment was its conclusion that Woodside did not know of the Delta Report prior
to selling the property to the Buyers." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2005 UT App 82,
TJ 12, n. 3. The Ruling states "[t]he only issue in dispute is what knowledge Woodside had
regarding collapsible soils on [Buyers'] lot[,]" and goes on to conclude that "[Buyers] have
not demonstrated that Woodside had any knowledge of remaining collapsible soils on
[Buyers'] lot," (R. at 900 (Buyers incorrectly attribute this holding to the Yazd court in their
brief (Brief of Appellee at 21).) The sole basis for the trial court's grant of summary
judgment was Buyers' failure to produce any evidence that Woodside had knowledge of
collapsible soils on Buyers' lot.
8

Buyers presented no evidence of Woodside having knowledge of adverse conditions on
Buyers' lot. (R. at 898-900.)
Buyers' attempts to distinguish Fennell also fail. The fact that Fennell involved a
developer, that the soils report for the lot was available for inspection, and that the soils
engineer testified that he thought the lot was fine have nothing to do with the Fennell court's
ultimate holding. Buyers again completely ignore the Field Report and attempt to focus the
Court's attention on the Delta Report, comparing the Delta Report to the report discussed in
Fennell. That comparison fails because the Field Report, not the Delta Report, is the
equivalent to the soils report discussed in Fennell. The Field Report shows that Woodside
did not engage in fraudulent activity because it informed Woodside that there were no
adverse soils conditions on Buyers' lot.
B.

Woodside Fulfilled Its Duties Under Frandsen.

Buyers articulate three duties allegedly set out in Frandsen: (1) a duty to exercise
reasonable care to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type
of ordinary, average dwelling house, (2) a duty to disclose to the purchaser any condition
which the builder knows or reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable
for such residential building, and (3) upon inquiry, the builder must disclose information it
has developed in the course of the subdivision process which is relevant to the suitability of
the land for its expected use. (Brief of Appellee at 23 (citing Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT
55, 94 P.3d 919).) Woodside has fulfilled all those duties.6

6

Also of note is that Buyers have been compensated for their alleged damages under
the contractual warranty provided by Woodside. Buyers rec eived an award for their contract
9

By seeking and obtaining a soils report for Buyers lot when it was aware of the
collapsible soils to a depth of 2/4 on Buyers' lot and (for purposes of this appeal) to a depth
of five feet in a location 120 feet from a corner of Buyers' lot, Woodside was exercising
reasonable care to insure that the Buyers' lot was suitable for construction of an average
dwelling house. A soils engineer informed Woodside that the underlying soils on Buyers'
lot were suitable for construction. There is nothing more that Woodside could have done to
exercise reasonable care. Thus, Woodside met the first Frandsen duty.
Once Woodside obtained the Field Report, it did not know of any condition that would
make Buyers' lot unsuitable for construction, meeting the second Frandsen duty. Buyers
believe that failing to turn over the Delta Report constitutes a violation of this duty. Again,
Buyers argument ignores the Field Report. Even if Woodside was aware of the contents of
the Delta Report, it does not address the conditions (specifically or generally) on Buyers' lot.
The Field Report does address the specific conditions on Buyers' lot and informed Woodside
that there were no conditions that would make Buyers' lot unsuitable for a residential
building.
Finally, Buyers never made an inquiry to Woodside about information developed in
the subdivision process so the third Frandsen duty was never triggered. Despite Buyers'
contention, complaining about alleged problems in a house several years after it was built and

claims when those claims were arbitrated, and Woodside satisfied that award. (See
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot
filed in the Court of Appeals on November 19, 2004 and Exs. A-C thereto.)
10

sold cannot constitute an inquiry. Because Woodside has met all of the duties triggered
under it, Frandsen cannot serve as a basis for Buyers' fraud claims.
CONCLUSION
Buyers are correct that Utah is undergoing tremendous growth and as a result seeing
a tremendous amount of home construction. Nevertheless, the duty which the Court of
Appeals adopted is unprecedented. Buyers would have the Court believe that home
purchasers are completely without recourse unless the duty set out by the Court of Appeals
is adopted by this Court. Home purchasers can and do obtain protection by obtaining a
contractual warranty, as the Buyers did in this case. Woodside is a conscientious home
builder and has met all of its duties under Utah law. It does not cut comers and did not cut
comers in this case. Woodside took steps to ensure that the underlying soils would support
Buyers' house by obtaining the Field Report. Woodside did not defraud Buyers, and Buyers
have presented no evidence to show that Woodside was aware of any adverse condition on
Buyers' lot. As such, Woodside respectfully requests thai the decision of the Court of
Appeals be reversed and the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in
favor of Woodside be affirmed.
DATED this

A

day of October, 2005.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN] GEE & LOVELESS

Ronald

sJZ.

. Russell
Timothy B. Smith
Attorneys for Appellant/Petitioner
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